An insider’s account of the evacuation of Babylon
In his first interview since returning to Europe, Dr René Teijgeler, former senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, speaks about his experiences in Baghdad

UTRECHT. René Teijgeler (54), a Dutch conservator specialising in the preservation and management of non-Western artefacts and documents, served as senior advisor of the United States Embassy to the Iraqi Ministry of Culture from July 2004 to March 2005.

With the withdrawal from Iraq of the Dutch on 10 March, Teijgeler left Iraq. His tasks have now been taken over by Robert Kerr, cultural affairs officer of the US embassy.

Dr Teijgeler spoke to The Art Newspaper about his experiences in Iraq—his first interview since returning to Europe.


GS: What is your training and background?

I studied sociology, anthropology, bookbinding and conservation. Since 1996 I have run a bureau called Paper in Development, for the preservation and management mainly of collections of non-Western artefacts and documents. I have worked extensively in libraries, archives and museums in developing countries.

GS: How did you get to be Senior Advisor to the Iraq Ministry of Culture?

At a Blue Shield symposium in spring 2003 I heard a presentation on the cultural affairs unit of CIMIC [CIMIC stands for Civil Military Co-operation, a NATO programme for sending militarised civilian experts into the field to perform tasks for which the military is unequipped. The Netherlands, Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway form CIMIC Group North, the Dutch contingent includes a unit of militarised cultural heritage experts]. I offered my services and was taken on. I was given four weeks of basic training, waited a while, had another two weeks of instruction about the mission and was shipped out to Baghdad by the Dutch army as a major in the reserves. Two weeks after I arrived my predecessor [Zainab Bahrani] left and I was promoted in quick stages to Senior Advisor.

GS: What facilities were you offered?

I was attached to the US embassy, in the Republican Palace in Baghdad. There were 1,600 people working there, who all had to be put up inside the Green Zone. The Palace was surrounded by an improvised trailer park, where the sewage tanks were always running over. At first I was able to spend free time in the cafés outside the perimeter, but after they were hit by a bomb attack, we all had to stay inside the palace grounds. My trailer was a 10-minute walk from my office. Most of the Senior Advisors had extra staff, but all I had was a translator. The most important instrument at my disposal was the high status of the position of Senior Advisor. In military terms, this was equivalent to the rank of a general; it gave me access to people in command.

GS: How did the function of Senior Advisor originate and what did it entail?

The Americans offer an advisor to each of the ministries of the Iraqi government. It is up to the minister whether or not to accept the offer. The first advisors for the Ministry of Culture were the Italian diplomats Pietro Cordone followed by Mario Bondioli Osio. They were succeeded by John Malcolm Russell and Zainab Bahrani. The quick succession of advisors was confusing for the Iraqis. When I assumed office, I was the fourth cultural advisor within a period of four months.

GS: Why is it that your predecessors received lots of publicity and you did not?

I chose to avoid the press and the media. I did this mostly for my personal safety but also because keeping a low profile made it easier for me to negotiate.

GS: How did you establish your priorities?

They defined themselves. In the first place, I had to win the confidence of the Minister of Culture, which took a while. On the ground there were two major challenges, safeguarding the National Library and protecting Babylon. The National Museum could pretty much take care of itself. The National Library and Archive had been gutted by fire and 70% of the collections were lost. But 42,000 documents, including rich archives from the Ottoman era, had survived in the basement of the Ministry of the Interior, where they were damaged by water. I got a $100,000 grant from the US army for freezer trucks to stabilise them. A team of three Iraqi restorers are going to take a course in paper conservation at the Library of Congress and come back to restore the archive.

Before I arrived an Italian NGO had set up an electronic cataloguing project. We worked very well together until the two staff members, the two Simonas, were kidnapped in October 2004. Soon after I went to Europe with the director of the library for three weeks to raise money. Basic repairs got under way at the beginning of 2005, but there is still not enough money for proper reconstruction.

I gave high priority to training and improving management. To take full advantage of the training opportunities that were offered to us, I introduced the rule that everyone who went abroad had to speak English. In December 2004 more than 10 restorers-in-training went to the Czech Republic for a two-month course on conservation. I could have established high-profile, expensive, prestige programmes, but instead I chose to invest in human capital.

The Ministry of Culture sent 100 of its people to the American University of Beirut last month, for a month-long course in management and team building. In the near future we hope to send as many as 500 others.

GS: What was the problem at Babylon?

Babylon is one of the most important archaeological sites in the Middle East. While heavy combat was still going on, the US Marines set up a base to protect it. Then, in September 2003 the Multinational Division South Central (MND-CS), under Polish command, established its regional base there. What happened next is incomprehensible. Halliburton-KBR, the main US Army contractor for non-military activities, got permission to set up a regional logistic centre in Babylon. They levelled large tracts with earth-moving equipment to create flat storage areas for heavy items like trailers, containers and chemical toilets. When the dust cleared, there were 2,500 troops stationed at Babylon. The Polish militarised archaeologists managed to prevent some destruction, but a lot of damage was done.

GS: How did you get Camp Babylon evacuated?

I worked out a plan from which everyone would benefit. The Iraqis were going to get the site back under their control; they received $200,000 and lots of equipment; 350 jobs were created for paid guards, who received uniforms, arms and other equipment.

The benefit for the Americans was considerable. It might not seem that way, but they worry a lot about international law. Even though the US is not a signatory to The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in the Event of Armed Conflict, the Army claims to behave in the spirit of the convention. Halliburton-KBR was easy to please. They made money out of demolishing the old camp and building the new one.

The Poles were another story. In the beginning they were dead set against the move. It took a direct command from Warsaw to get them to clear out.

Even with basic agreement between all parties, things were not happening quickly enough. I encouraged the Minister of Culture to write a letter to the then US ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, requesting a speedier evacuation. With the help of General Charles Davidson, head of Civil Military Affairs, who was genuinely concerned about Iraqi culture and history, I reached George Casey, US Commanding General of the Multi-National Force in Iraq. General Davidson and I drafted a response to the Minister of Culture assuring him that all coalition troops would be out of Babylon by January 2005. Once the Americans gave their word, they followed through.

The logistical problems were vast. 882 trucks rode on and off day and night for months, moving everything to Diwanya, about 100 kilometres away. To dissolve oil spills, we brought in oil-eating bacteria. Everyone involved had to be made aware of the danger of causing new damage. It happened. Babylon is now empty and under Iraqi control. Conferring about the evacuation on site one day, I found myself staring at the huge concrete security blocks that the coalition forces put at the end of the famous Paradise Road. The heavy trucks that put them there destroyed many of the 2,500 year-old baked tiles paving the road. I asked the Iraqis how they were going to remove these eyesores; they did not know. Taking advantage of the moment, I got the Poles to lift the blocks out with Chinook helicopters.

GS: A year ago you were a self-employed consultant on conservation; for seven months in the interim you were the cultural proconsul of Iraq; and now you’re a private citizen again. How does that feel?

Weird. All development work is addictive, but Iraq was something else. On the one hand I felt like a potentate, with powers that I never had before. And on the other hand... My colleague Jim Mollen, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Education, with whom I shared an office in Baghdad, was killed last November four days before he was going to go home. The day she was kidnapped, I was scheduled to meet with Simona Torretta. A convoy to al-Hatra that I almost joined was attacked by terrorists.

I left with the feeling that I had done good work. Before the American invasion of Najaf, I impressed on the Deputy Chief of Mission, James Jeffrey, that the Mosque of Imam Ali there is very holy to the Shi’ites. I arranged for an archaeologist to be attached to the Project Contract Office, so all building plans could be monitored. I assisted Iraq in re-enlisting the major international cultural organisations.

The US has asked me to return to Baghdad in September as a civilian advisor to set up and support national programmes for archives and libraries.

The contribution of Dutch militarised cultural specialists in Iraq, mainly in Uruq, has attracted attention. I hope the Dutch decision makers will realise that they have a major lead in the field of military-cultural expertise compared to most other countries. Unfortunately so far nothing new has materialised, but we hope our government will pick up on these opportunities. The Ethnographic Museum in Kabul, for which our help has been requested, would be an excellent project.

With my experience in this line of work and with my new military contacts, I am planning to found an NGO for cultural development work in countries in conflict, filling the gap between military presence and the arrival of civilian specialists. I am working on this with the CIMIC officer who recruited me, Joris Kila.

GS: You were known to oppose the war in Iraq. Did your conscience bother you working for the Americans in Iraq?

I was not in favour of the American invasion of Iraq. But when I got there, I decided that recriminations would do no one any good. I accepted reality as I encountered it and set out to effect whatever improvements I could. To get anything done in a war zone you have to cooperate with the military, whether you like it or not. Once you accept that fact of life many things become possible. Without the coalition forces I could have done nothing for Iraq’s cultural heritage. Moreover, I soon realised that whatever damage the coalition troops have done, the effects of Saddam’s rule were far worse.

The Americans did not invent war, and it is not going to disappear from the planet any time soon. With this awareness, I avoided the question of blame altogether and concentrated on what to do next. This was also the spirit in which I dealt with the Iraqis and the Poles, who were not talking to each other when I arrived. I agreed with them in advance that we were not going to assign blame, only to seek common solutions to common problems. It worked for me, and I made it work for them.

With thanks to Joris Kila.

Related article:
The looting of the Iraq Museum, Baghdad