ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER YALE UNIVERSITY P.O. Box 208269 27 Hillhouse Avenue New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8269 CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 791 THE ECONOMICS OF LENDING WITH JOINT LIABILITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE Maitreesh Ghatak University of Chicago Timothy W. Guinnane Yale University October 1998 Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and critical comments. The Economic of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice Maitreesh Ghatak* Timothy I Guinnane ** *University of Chicago **Yale University Abstract Institutions that rely on joint liability to facilitate lending to the poor have a long history and are now a common feature of many developing countries. Economists have proposed several theories of joint liability lending that stress various aspects of its informational and enforcement advantages over other forms of lending. This paper analyzes how joint-liability lending promotes screening, monitoring, state verification, and enforcement of repayment. An empirical section draws on case studies to highlight how joint liability works in practice. Keywords: Joint Liability, Group Lending, Credit Cooperatives. JEL Classification Numbers: D82, G20, N23, O12